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THE IOS STORY, OR
"Do you sincerely want to be rich?" was the question
Bernie Cornfeld always posed to potential salesmen for
Investors Overseas Services (IOS) in the 1960s. Since
Cornfeld, founder and president of the then rapidly
growing company, rarely received a negative response,
he had no trouble building an army of IOS salesmen
that in its heyday reached a total of 76,000.
Cornfeld actually started with a good idea, to sell
mutual funds to Americans living overseas and so allow
them to participate in the U.S. securities market. But his
version of"people's capitalism" got away from him in
the bullish atmosphere of the 60s, and by the end of
the decade he was heading an empire with 250,000
investors and some $2.3 billion in assets.
Thus, when the market began to plummet in 1970,
IOS headquarters in Ferney-Voltaire, France (just across
the border from Geneva, which had kicked IOS out
two years earlier) was flooded with requests for
redemptions. Company management panicked and
threw Cornfeld out, then looked for a savior whose
charisma would equal that of their former leader. They
thought they had such a person in Robert Lee Vesco.
Their decision marked the beginning of the end for
IOS, and with the company's slow and painful demise
came the beginning of what would become the
longest-running, farthest-reaching liquidation in history.
Indeed, historians may one day call it the most significant
international liquidation ever to have taken place.

i

THE LIQUIDATION OF A LIVELY
by J O H N A. ORR/Partner, Toronto

Before July, 1973, all I knew about IOS
was what had been in the papers. I
didn't know that there were four Dollar Funds, so called because subscribers invested their money in U.S.
dollars. But I was soon to learn a lot
about all four, and especially the two
Ontario-based funds, the Fund of
Funds, Ltd., and IOS Growth Fund, Ltd.
(also known as Transglobal Growth
Fund, Ltd.).
I first got wind of things when a call
came in from a senior partner of Borden & Elliot, a prominent law firm in
Toronto. They had become involved in
the IOS affair and were about to make
an application to the Ontario court
requesting the appointment of a liquidator for Fund of Funds (FOF) and IOS
Growth Fund (Growth). They needed
a name to submit with their application and thought of me.
I had worked with George Cihra and
others at Borden & Elliot in previous
financial matters and receiverships,
and they were aware of my work as
financial counsel to justice S. H. S
Hughes in the Royal Commission on
Atlantic Acceptance Corporation, ltd.
And my work was also familiar to the
courts. But 1 had no idea what I was
getting into, and the whole thing happened over the course of one weekend. I did make it a point to talk to my
partners at louche Ross, and they
promised to take some of my work
load if IOS demanded too much of my
lime. That was fortunate, since we are
now in the sixth year of the liquidation
and the end may not be reached for
another four years at least.
2

It is worth noting that the appointment of a permanent liquidator is an
unusual step for a Canadian court. The
Ontario court was in the process of
naming 1 he Public trustee of the Province of Ontario for the liquidation,
when Borden & Elliot got involved, on
behalf of a group of German investors
in the funds. The investors, for a variety
of reasons, felt that their interests
would be better represented by a private liquidator than by the public
trustee. The latter would fall under
government jurisdiction; the former
would be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court.
Section 217 of our Business Corporations Act describes what a temporary liquidator shall do under the
appropriate circumstances, but it
doesn't even mention a permanent
liquidator. However, Justice Lloyd
Houlden of the Supreme Court of
Ontario considered that it was important to include this wording because of
all the confusion and counterclaims
surrounding the funds. Permanent
meant that 1 was an officer of the
court, subject to the rules of the Supreme Court of Ontario. The title had a
solid, no-nonsense ring to it.
The reason for Canada's sudden interest in the remains of IOS was, in
part, one of embarrassment. For years,
FOF and Growth had operated freely
from Ontario. But since their activities
look place outside Canada, they didn't
have to report anything to the Ontario
Securities Commission. Indeed, the
Ontario location appeared prominently in each fund's prospectus, add-

ing an air of credibility that (he facts
did not warrant.
So when the Securities and Exchange Commission of the U.S. released its explosive report on Robert
Vesco's takeover and plunder of the
IOS funds in the fall of 1972, Canadians
began to ask themselves what had
gone wrong. Since then, our government has taken an active and concerned interest in the goings-on of all
lOS-related companies in Canada.
As permanent liquidator, my assignment was to:
— Protect the remaining assets of FOF
and Growth,
— Ascertain the identity and entitlement of creditors and investors and
their claims,
— Distribute the remaining assets according to the above.
Before any of these things could be
done, I had to find the assets and
establish my competency to claim
them on behalf of the shareholders.
Finding the assets is a fairly standard
part of a liquidator's job. You establish
opening balances and then ask yourself some questions; a) What does this
company say that it |wns? b) Where is
it, so I can put a claim on it? c) And this
is the tricky part, if it exists, why do I
gel it and not someone else? Will
people accept my order to transfer it
to me as liquidator?
What made the IOS assignment so
unique was, first, the diversity of the
assets, the investments themselves.
Some were restricted securities, some
were traded securities. All had been
set up in such a way as to ensure that
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the shareholders of the funds avoided
paying taxes. That had been a plus for
shareholders bark in the 60s but
worked against us now, since we had
to deal with a plethora of regulatory
authorities in trying to establish our
competency.
Establishing competency is primarily
a legal mailer, arid so partner Alan
Moreton, myself, and others at louche
Ross have worked as a team with
members of Borden & Elliot, principally George Cihra, Reno Stradiotto, and
John Warren. Because of the multiplicity of jurisdictions and (he legal
ramifications, we have relied on legal
counsel far more than in a "normal"
liquidation. Unlike the U.S., which
usually names a lawyer as liquidator, in
Canada we appoint a Chartered Accountant for (his kind of job, so legal
counsel has been necessary from day
one.
However, we found 1 hat even the
recognition of our competency was
not enough to guarantee us access to
fund money. IOS was different from

other liquidations, in the second place,
because a lot of people were laying
claim to the same assets.. and still are.
So even when we located funds, and
were recognized as having a legitimate
claim to them, other people were
making similar and seemingly legitimate claims on the same assets. Not
only Vesco and his cohorts, but also
the liquidators and receivers for the
other Dollar Funds and IOS, Ltd. Plus,J
lot of counterclaims by various regulatory authorities and shareholder
groups, each seeking to represent the
interests of all IOS shareholders.
Our situation may be depicted as
that of a surgical team trying to do an
autopsy on a corpse—except that the
corpse keeps jumping off the table,
trying to take the instruments right out
of the doctor's hands.
I was blissfully unaware of what lay
ahead—the size of the case, the people-oriented problems, the time and
travel demands—when my appointment became official on August 1,
1973. My preparation had consisted of
reading everything I could get my
hands on: affidavits, the SEC-Vesco
complaint, the book about Cornfeld,
Do You Sincerely Want to Be Rich?
I hen our team met, and we decided
the first thing to do was to go and find
some money. I he court had appointed
a liquidator, but it was up to the liquidator to find enough money to carry
out the liquidation. Until we did so,
everything was being financed out of
our own pockets.
We knew from preliminary reading
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that there was fund money, a lot of it, at
the Bank of Montreal. We were a little
naive to think that we could take a
briefcase there and be recognized as a
nice honest liquidator and that the
bank would then hand us $50-60 million. Let's say that that trip added to
our knowledge of what lay ahead. We
realized, firs! of all, that cooperation
with the other Dollar Funds was essential. Secondly, we saw that some
kind of accord would have to be
reached with the SEC.
(he SEC had been following the
fortunes of IOS since the mid-60s, and
had done an excellent research job in
pulling together their report on the
company in 1972. Moreover, they had
been through a trying period of dealing with people in high places who
Were trying to influence them and get
them off the case, Vesco's 5200,000
unreported donation to the Committee to Re-Elect the President was the
most notorious example.
Besides, for years the SEC has had a
policy of policing companies which do
business in the U.S., regardless of the
country of origin. Although only 200
Americans in the U.S. bought shares in
IOS, many Americans overseas were,
hurl, and the SEC felt that it was the
one body with enough power to pull
together all the disparate pieces of the
IOS puzzle. So they had been fighting
for a U.S.-appointed receiver to lake
over the assets of IOS, wherever they
might be. Along comes a Canadian
liquidator following on work they'd
already done, and it's easy to see why

with this in mind, I hey were cross.
How upset they were became apparent when we went to New York for
a meeting in September, 1973, a month
after my appointment. We were planning to meet with some former IOS
officers who had some useful data, but
counsel who had acted for IOS arranged a meeting to introduce me to
Judge Charles E. Stewart, jr., who was
presiding over the SEC suit in New
York. At the same time and unknown
to me, counsel also informed the SEC
that I was to meet with Judge Stewart
concerning my role as permanent
liquidator. All of a sudden, we were
in a meeting with fudge Stewart and
several SEC lawyers who were in
telephone communication with Washington.
After some tense interchange I said,
"Listen, I'm here to say hello, so that
you can see what the Canadian liquidator looks like. But we aren't about to
argue over who is a receiver and who
isn't, and we don't wish to pursue that
discussion at this time." At which point
judge Stewart asked if I am related to
the hockey player Bobby Orr, and the
meeting broke up.
It was clear then that we would have
to work with the SEC, or we'd wind up
fighting each other and Vesco would
benefit. But it took six months of redrafting before we worked up an
agreement acceptable to the SEC and
to ourselves. That document, called a
consent order, stipulates that 1 must
keep judge Stewart and the SEC informed of my progress, and that I may

accept rulings from Stewart. Bui in the
case of conflicting orders, my final
judgment will come from justice
Houlden of the Ontario court.
Since the signing of the consent
order, we have had excellent working
relations with the SEC, But for those
first six months, the going was tough.
Meanwhile* we had been on 30 or
more fact-finding missions to Europe
and the Caribbean—still subsidized by
our own money—over a three-month
period. Now, some big figures began
to be bandied about, and I realized
that the collection and distribution of a
possible $100 million was going to take
a lot longer than I'd thought.
My next step was to attend a meeting of the regulatory bodies which had
first got together six months earlier.
This group, which came to be known
as the International Regulatory Committee (also known as the Regulatory
Authority Croup), consisted of representatives of the Ontario Securities
Commission, the Quebec Securities
Commission, the SEC, the Luxembourg Banking Commissioner, judge
Weber who was presiding over IOSrelated matters in Switzerland; and all
liquidators and receivers who had
been appointed up to that time. I his
was our first exposure to the diplomacy necessary in a multinational environment among people with competing jurisdictions and interests.
We saw, first, that liquidators for the
two remaining Dollar Funds—International Investment Trust (JIT), domiciled in Luxembourg, and Venture
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Fund N.V., domiciled in C u r a c a o needed to be appointed before the
Bank of Montreal would consider releasing the IOS assets it held. Eventually; they were appointed, and from
then on we worked together in relative
harmony. We fried to track down fund
money and apportion it equitably
among the Dollar Funds and, through
a combined administrative vehicle,
pay dividends to actual investors in the
funds.
White this was going on, we heard
about some assets that might be obtained in Panama. A company called
Dominion Guaranty had been formed
there by a group of IOS salesmen in
the Cornfeld era, probably as a sort of
payoff. Actually, Dominion was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of FOF Proprietary Funds, Ltd. (Prop), which in
turn was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
FOF
Since most of the assets of FOF were
held in the name of Prop, it was important that FOF's liquidator gain control of Prop The latter, after all, was
neither in liquidation nor bankruptcy.
As liquidator of FOF, I held all shares of
Prop, so we formed a new board
which elected me president of Prop,
Having laid this groundwork, we were
in good shape to take over Dominion
Guaranty and its assets of some threequarters of a million dollars.
We flew down to Panama and took
over Dominion much as we had taken
over Prop. Since our Panamanian
counsel didn't like the idea of one man
taking over the company, we signed

the final papers in our Panama office,
not his. Then we learned that the
remaining assets of Dominion were in
London, not Panama. So we took our
documents, all beautifully bound in
blue ribbon, and flew to London.
The bank manager to whom we
presented ourselves was impressed by
neither documents nor ribbons. He
insisted on an indemnification against
any suit that might be brought against
him within 30 days for releasing the
money. So George Cihra dictated such
a memo to a secretary at the same
time thai the banker was sweating and
signing.
Then we had the $750,000 transferred to an Ontario bank. This was
Our first real milestone—finding a kitty
from which to operate. Our accomplishment was well-timed, for in the
same period of September-October
1973, we began to feel the first countermoves by Vesco and his principal
associate, Canadian-born accountant
Norman LeBlanc.
I he Vesco interests brought an action in the Bahama courts, whereby
they pressed for the appointment of a
liquidator for IOS Program Ltd. They
claimed that Program was an intermediary between the shareholders
and the liquidators of the four funds.
Presumably the liquidators of FOF,
Growth, IIT, and Venture should collect all the assets and turn them over to
Program's liquidator, who would then
distribute them in the best interests of
the shareholders.
the Bahamas were friendly territory

for Vesco, and the result of his actions
was an injunction by the Bahamian
court, effectively freezing all IOS
assets in the Bahamas for a number of
months. We knew that the Bahamas
Commonwealth Bank (BCB) was a
vehicle through which significant sums
of IOS money flowed, and we also
knew that there was about $5 million
in another sub-depository bank there.
We immediately began w o r k i n g
through legal counsel to get the injunction lilted.
In February, 1974,1 was in the Bahamas for meetings, but planned to leave
after a day to join my family in Florida.
One of the IIT liquidators begged me
to stay over. I did so, reluctantly, and
the very next day the injunction was
lifted. It was lifted for only two days,
but that was enough time for me to
present my credentials and remove
$5.6 million. If I hadn't stayed over to
help the liquidator of IIT, who knows
how long it might have taken to get
that money.
Meanwhile, I had received my exemplification in Luxembourg (i.e., was
recognized as being who I said I was),
and it seemed like a straightfoward
matter to present credentials at the
two sub-depository banks we knew
about and take our money. But when
we got to the banks, we were told that
while our credentials were well and
good, their customer was Overseas
D e v e l o p m e n t Bank L u x e m b o u r g
(ODBL). O D B L had been part of a
banking network set up by the Vesco
group to loot the funds, and ODBL

had in (urn sub-deposited funds in
other banks.
So we went to O D S L and asked for
an assignment to pay. At first, they
brought up the problem of exemplification. When that was resolved, the
question came up of whether O D B L
was solvent or not. A commissioner
was appointed to check the bank's
solvency, and he decided that it had to
be put into controlled management.
Three new commissioners were appointed to that task.
Their review took months. They
reached the conclusion that if all the
Dollar Funds were to be paid out
dollar for dollar, O D B L would be
bankrupt and the mess would take
years to clean up. t h e y suggested
drafting a plan whereby the bank
might stay solvent, even by a dollar's
worth, and an orderly liquidation
might occur. So we got together with
the commissioners and the other fund
liquidators and worked out a plan.
Then that plan was circulated to the
creditors of O D B L , approved, and
brought before the L u x e m b o u r g
courts, which accepted it.
At that point, we again went to
Luxembourg to pick up the money.

Our problem this time was that no one
wanted to take the check when we
tried to redeposit it in some other
bank. For political reasons, we needed
to leave the money in Luxembourg;
but every day that we walked around
the city with $4.5 million in our pockets, it was costing the fund shareholders a bundle of dough.
Finally one of the 1IT liquidators
prevailed upon a Swiss bank to accept
a $4.5 million deposit, I he bank manager was perspiring, but he took the
check, in the name of John Orr. Not
myself as liquidator, but just John Orr,
resident of Canada. We thought it a
very good idea to have George Cihra
as a signing officer, just in case something happened to me while flying
back to Ontario. In fact, we thought it
such a good idea that we laughed
about it all the way home... for we
wound up taking the same plane back
to Toronto!
Along about this time we began to
be concerned about the taxation issue.
Here we were repatriating money to
Canada and putting it into certificates
of deposit, and the interest would
normally be taxable. The funds hadn't
paid Canadian taxes as non-resident
corporations, but that situation no
longer applied. And the taxes to be
paid would be fairly significant. We
raised the question: was this fair to all
those international investors, whose
money was being repatriated at the
behest of the Canadian government?
We were frankly concerned, because this issue could be used against

us by the ever-active Vesco group. It
might be held as proof that we were
trying to rip off the funds for the
Canadian government. Eventually, we
got a ruling from our government that
the repatriated assets would not be
subject to tax. That was another satisfying milestone for us.
Sandwiched between these activities was our continuing interest in IOS
headquarters at Ferney-Voltaire. It was
obviously in the best interest of all the
liquidators to sort out the shareholder
records and keep the operation there
running. So work moved along on that
front (see accompanying story), and
after some quibbling among the liquidators concerning the apportionment
of costs, we directed the London office of Touche Ross to lake charge of
the work at Ferney.
We survived in all this confusion
with a slogan and a motto. The slogan
was: "Whom do you trust?" I started
out with the assumption that everyone
I met was guilty until proven innocent.
I figure if you go in looking for anything that will mark this person as a liar
or a cheat and you don't find anything,
then you've got a basis for trusting him
or her.
Our motto was "A laugh a clay."
Believe me, we couldn't have survived
the frustration without it. Things that
should have taken days took weeks,
and issues that might have been res o l v e d in weeks d r a g g e d on for
months.
From about mid-1974 on, our work
began to lake a more definite form.
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We knew that the Bank of Montreal
had about $106 million in fund money
and that at some point further down
the road all the fund liquidators would
have to get together and work out an
equitable distribution among us. We
had worked up an agenda of items to
examine one by one. For example,
should anybody be sued? We answered that one in the affirmative several times, and many litigations are still
pending.
For every step we look, we could
usually count on Vesco or LeBlanc to
counter with a step of their own. It was
like a game of chess on a global scale.
We know that LeBlanc forms companies as readily as he lights a cigarette,
and he can dispose of them just as
easily. So we decided that his shell
companies wouldn't bother us. As
long as we knew where the money
went in the first stages, where it went
after that was in a way academic.
The disappearance of $60 million
(out of our estimated $107 million in
recoverable assets) is more than academic, however. In 1972 Vesco funneled this sum into a Costa Rican shell
company called Inter-American Capital S.A. Fifty-four million was then
transferred into Phoenix Financial, a
Panamanian shell. Most of that found
its way to Trident Bank, Ltd., which is a
sub-depositor of Bahamas Commonwealth Bank. BCB is now in liquidation, but it look three years to reach
that point. Meanwhile, Vesco claims:
one, that he doesn't know anything
about the theft of the money; and,

two, that there isn't any left anyway.
We keep reminding ourselves that
we are after money, not people, but
people and personalities have a lot to
do with our degree of success. We've
met Vesco a few times in the Bahamas
and Costa Rica, and after the first
meeting I had to go over my files on
the man very carefully, to remind myself of the kind of person he is. He can
be deceptively charming.
Cornfeld, on the other hand, was
surprisingly devoid of charm the two
times we've spoken. Here was a man
whom associates swore was the epitome of charisma at his height, and
now he is not even particularly likeable.
Our reactions to Vesco and Cornfeld personally were not as important
to our job as getting along with the
liquidators of the other funds. IIT has
two lawyers and a CPA from Luxembourg, and Venture has a lawyer and
an accountant from Curacao, George
calls me the "elder statesman" of the
group, since they chose me to act as
chairman for our joint meetings. It
hasn't always been easy to come to
agreement, since we are from different
backgrounds, with different personalities, and we are responding to dissimilar legal requirements.
As North Americans, we tend to
lake a businessman's approach to a
liquidation: i.e., let's handle a problem
in the most expeditious way. The Europeans, however, take the position
that they are court-appointed liquidators, not businessmen. It they have to

spend $100 to fight over $1, they'll do
it. So there has been much to compromise in the years we have been
working together.
Another milestone was reached in
September, 1976, when we made our
first distribution of funds to Growth
shareholders. They have since received a second disbursement, and by
and large the settlement of I O S
Growth Fund is complete. Growth has
always been the easier of the two
funds to deal with. It was more recent,
so records were more up to date. Its
shareholders were virtually all German, so the shareholders were much
easier to track down. It was a smaller
fund, so the assets were easier to trace
and Vesco was less interested in siphoning them off.
The first checks were mailed to FOF
shareholders in July, 1977. The geographical dispersion of these investors
was one reason for the delay (again,
see accompanying story} but we also
couldn't pay a nickel til! our suit against
Bahamas Commonwealth Bank was
settled. Meanwhile, the regulatory
bodies were getting impatient, and we
were getting letters from people who
had heard about the liquidation and
wanted to know where their money
was. The other liquidators were unhappy because the unfavorable publicity was casting a bad light on all the
funds. So we geared up our machinery
at Ferney-Voltaire, and once the BCB
settlement came in May, 1977 we were
ready to roll.
Speaking of publicity, that is another

factor one doesn't tend to encounter
in a "normal" liquidation. Cornfeld
cultivated the press with his penchant
for beautiful women and opulent surroundings, and Vesco was no less
eager to have his name spread, though
he preferred the reputation of international financier to that of international
playboy. So anything to do with IDS
was fair game for the press in any one
of 150 countries boasting IOS investors.
Reporters often tried to listen in on
meetings of the Internationa! Regulatory Committee, but we tried to discourage this. We didn't know for sure
whom the reporters were representing; and as the committee itself grew,
we didn't always know all of its
members, either. I remember one
meeting in Luxembourg when we had
a group of some 60 people seated at
an L-shaped table. I looked around the
room and realized I didn't know half
the people I was talking to—and what's
more, the (able went around the
corner so I couldn't even see the other
half.
Then, at another regulatory meeting,
some reporters from the German
publication Der Speigel tried to gain
admittance. We refused the journalist,
but agreed to let the photographer, a
striking young woman, lake some pictures. It turned out that she was not
only a photographer but a reporter as
well, and she laced into us with a less
than flattering account of our activities
in the next issue. (Among other things,
one of the lesser delegates to that

meeting was unwise enough to make a
pass at her.)
It is now our intention to make a
second payment to FOF shareholders
in November, 1979. We are actively
involved in proceedings against seven
cash depositories, and are monitoring
closely some 38 claims relating to
portfolio securities.
To try to recover the missing $60
million which disappeared into InterAmerican Capital S.A., we have taken a
number of steps. We have brought
lawsuit's against almost everyone involved in the transactions which led to
the disappearance of the funds. We
have written several hundred letters to
Panamanian and Costa Rican banks
and regulatory authorities, asking for
additional information. We're even
open to discussing some sort of arrangement with Mr. Vesco, but he has
not heretofore indicated much willingness to cooperate.
On behalf of FOF shareholders, we
were successful in protecting the
assets of Global Natural Resources
Properties, Ltd,, a corporation which
was spun off from FOF in (970. Global's stock is not worthless, although

FOF shareholders might have thought
so at the lime. We went to court to
bring Global under the control of a
trustee, and we told FOF investors that
it was in their interest to obtain and
hold onto the shares of Global to
which they were entitled.
We've received many kind letters
from shareholders grateful for the
work we've done on their behalf. One
fellow wrote to say he was framing his
dividend check, rather than cashing it.
But we have a problem about what to
do with the money b e l o n g i n g to
shareholders we've been unable to
locate. It is in the bank earning interest,
and at some point the court will have
to resolve the question of who gets
that interest. Should it go to the shareholders who may turn up in the future?
People who came forward and were
paid at the outset might object, since it
has cost more of their money to locate
the laggards, the court will have to
grapple with that issue, and also the
question of what to do with the residual assets, once a final disbursement
has been made. There is bound to be
money left over from u n c l a i m e d
shares, and probably it won't be
enough to justify the expense of mailing out to all known shareholders. The
court might name a public trustee, or
an agent; we just don't know right now.
No other liquidation in history has
involved so much time and money, so
many creditors/investors (2S0,0()(J)
spread over such a wide geographical
area (the world). Some have called it
the first truly effective international

liquidation. Unfortunately, there is no
precept of international law to prevent
such a situation from happening again.
The role of the International Regulatory Committee is a temporary one,
and it has no supranational policing
authority in any case. Cooperation on
every level is essential in a liquidation
of this d i m e n s i o n , and we got it
through the committee, and through
our own team.
The Touche Ross office in Toronto
has provided ten members of that
team, and we've called upon Touche
Ross officers in Montreal, New York,
Houston, Denver, the Bahamas, Panama, London, France, and Tokyo.
We've also been most fortunate in our
choice of legal counsel. In addition,
we've enjoyed the confidence of the
Ontario court. So despite the aggravations and the setbacks, and the years
invested, we can look at this job as a
very special challenge.
I personally will be close to retirement age by the time the liquidation is
wound up. But I'm looking ahead with
anticipation. We were discussing this
matter with Vesco one day and he said,
"Why don't you fellows let go of this
one and go home?"
"No," we answered. "We'll get another one to work on so that George
and I will have something to do."
And Vesco responded, "What
makes you think that I'm not working
on another one right now?"
We are available.
®

Meanwhile,
back at
Ferney-Voltaire
In the glory days of IOS, FerneyVoltaire was an exciting place to work.
But when disillusionment set in during
the early 1970s, the headquarters staff
shrank to a handful
We realized that Ferney had to be in
good working order, if we were to
carry out our obligations as liquidators. So we, and eventually the liquidators of the four Dollar Funds collectively, took over the operation at
Ferney. The London office of Touche
Ross provided us with management
personnel.
Our work consisted of four stages:
— Validating and updating the shareholder records we had,
— Contacting the shareholders,
— Processing claims as they came in,
— Making payments.
We started with a two-reel computer tape confiscated from IOS
headquarters by the Swiss police. We
didn't know whether there might be
bugs in the computer program, and
we weren't sure if that tape was the
definitive version of the IOS master
file. So we conducted a computer
audit. This was a two-step operation
in which we both proved details on a
sample of accounts going back
through all available investment
records and used records of computer
transaction tapes, which we found at
Ferney, to prove the validity of the
computer process records. In other
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words, we confirmed the current
details on the master tape and then
backtracked through the computer
processing records to make sure our
information cross-referenced to past
investment records. We found an
extremely high confidence ratio this
way.
At the same time, we were developing a completely new set of data
updating and managing information
for the computer program. The IOS
master tape was quite non-standard
and required use of a low-level computer language. So we rewrote the
program from scratch to bring the
program to a more standard, sophisticated, and manageable form.
Then we set up standards for the
processing of claims. These standards
had to be worked out by the four
funds' liquidators, drawn up and submitted to courts in Ontario, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands Antilles
for approval. To meet everyone's
requirements, we wound up building
a Rolls Royce that me! very stringent
specifications. Everything had to be
worked out and agreed upon—the
drawing up of Confirmations of Statements of Account (CSAs), the amount
of proof needed and for what value of
account, the definition of high- and
low-value accounts, signature guaranty, death claims, divorces, changes of
name, minors reaching adulthood. As
an adjunct, we had to train people to
carry out our clerical testing
procedures.
We completed the above by March,
1975, and the following month we
began to mail out our statements of
account for all the Dollar Funds, starling with Growth. By August we had
completed all 250,001) mailings. In the
first week, after a mailing of 60,000,
we had 5,000 letters returned because
of incorrect address. We were initially
discouraged, but our overall first-time
response was 40 percent.

We achieved this level of 100,000
replies by October (975. We waited
that long for our "cutoff point,"
because we were mailing to practically every country in the world, many
with inefficient mailing systems. Moreover, we were mailing in only four languages (English, French, Spanish and
German), and many more tongues
were represented among the fundholders. In addition, IOS customers
tended to be highly mobile people
who were often away from their
home addresses.
Since we were obliged to make
every possible effort to contact shareholders, we then remailed the CSAs,
with a new letter, to the non-respondents. We got replies from another
25,000 this way.
Bui 50 percenl were still missing. So
we set up a procedure to trace them,
using both internal and external documentation. We also picked up clues
from the shareholders' original application forms, especially for accounts
in which the address had been bad to
start with. We ran ads in various newspapers, advising IOS shareholders thai
a disbursement of assets was in the
offing. Finally, we ran a third and final
mailing.
Our track record for Growth Fund is
satisfying; we have located 96 percent
of its shareholders by number and 99
percent by value of shares owned. For
Fund of Funds, we have fared less
well. We finally tracked down 78 percent of its shareholders by number,
but this represented 93 percent by
value and determined our cutoff
point. We are no longer actively looking for shareholders.
We anticipated that there might be
problems of manipulation and control
as the CSAs were returned. In one
week, at our peak, we had 15,000 letters come in. So we laid down our
processing procedures most carefully.
All claims were double-checked. If a

claim was for over $500, the shareholder's signature had to be guaranteed in some way. Also, we checked
each signature on the CSA against the
client's application signature. This was
a hand job, one of the few facets of
the operation we could not assign to
the computer. Plus, we had a sample
check of work by supervisors and a
separate sample check by audit. Our
staff at Ferney grew from 6 in May,
1975, to some 170 at our peak in September, 1976.
When we reached the stage of
making payments, we had further
headaches. We looked worldwide for
a bank to make the payments, and
had very few offers. We needed a
bank with credibility, financial
wherewithal, considerable assets (all
the checks had to be dated and
mailed the same day, since the German fund holders were sensitive to the
fluctuations of the Deutschmark), and
computer expertise.
Toronto Dominion Bank was our
final choice. All our payment instructions to them are handled by computer, and their notification to us of
payment is done likewise. We even
have a subsidiary computer system to
keep track of what happens to each
check after mailing.
Since May, 1978, it has no longer
been advantageous for FOF and
Growth to operate from Ferney. Our
computer tapes are in Ontario and
our records must end up here anyway,
since the court will eventually take
over any unfinished aspects of the liquidation. The other two Dollar Funds
are wrapping up their operations at
Ferney as well, though for the
moment the IOS archives remain there.
The archives remain, as does one
other momento of the Cornfeld days
of glory—a huge hole which was to
have been the foundation for a magnificent building to house the IOS
empire.
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